inclusive," to denote the union of speaker and addressee. A more precise projection of grammatical metaphors would help draw our attention to possible differences between truly second-person and first-person inclusive phenomena in speaker-addressee interaction.
strates, many languages exhibit tight formal resemblances between the "ignorative" (≈ interrogative) and "deictic" forms. In English, the pairings are limited (there is no rhyming deictic counterpart of who or which). But there are other languages, such as Japanese and Tamil, where perfect formal proportions run through extensive systems organized around different epistemic domains (including many -like "in which manner," "which side" -that are not obviously lexicalized in English). Japanese is particularly informative here, because its deictic series regularly opposes three values: near the speaker (k-initial, e.g., kore "this one"), near the addressee (s-initial: sore "that one near you") and near neither (a-initial: are "that one [near neither of us]). We do not yet know if this shapes different attentional strategies in English and Japanese demonstrative use.
Some epistemic asymmetries reflect the difference between what is subjectively knowable (e.g., "feel lonely") and what can be known by observation (e.g., give outward signs of feeling lonely). Many languages, for example, Japanese, employ different grammatical constructions for these two types. Interestingly, as interactants pass from statement ("I am lonely") to question ("Are you lonely?"), the locus of "subjective authority" is passed to the addressee, sanctioning the use of the basic "private predicate" form in the second person (and now no longer applicable to the first).
Ultimately we must seek a model of social cognition that is equally informed by neuroscience and by linguistics. Studies of diverse grammatical systems and how they are used have the advantage of drawing on the variety of cognitively congenial systems evolved by different communities through time and -by hypothesis -potentially reconfiguring the brains of different language-speakers in subtly varying ways, which should form the subject matter for a second-generation of second-person neuroscience that includes interaction with language structure, as well as interaction with addressees.
N O T E
1. See Wechsler (2010) for a synthesis of linguistic observations regarding the issue of self-ascription (i.e., who is the "self" addressed by "you").
From synthetic modeling of social interaction to dynamic theories of brain-bodyenvironment-body-brain systems Abstract: Synthetic approaches to social interaction support the development of a second-person neuroscience. Agent-based models and psychological experiments can be related in a mutually informing manner. Models have the advantage of making the nonlinear brainbody-environment-body-brain system as a whole accessible to analysis by dynamical systems theory. We highlight some general principles of how social interaction can partially constitute an individual's behavior.
We agree with Schilbach et al. that the neuroscience of sociality should be enriched by a better understanding of the constitutive role of social interaction. An important challenge faced by the development of a second-person neuroscience is to devise new concepts and methods that can adequately capture and explain its complex dynamics.
From a dynamical perspective, an agent's behavior is an emergent property of the brain-body-environment nonlinear system (Beer 2000) . The parametric coupling between subsystems (i.e., its brain, body, and environment) constitutes one encompassing system, and it is only in this holistic context that the agent's behavior can be distinguished as such. The same applies to social behavior among several agents. In the case when the current environment of an agent A includes another agent B, and vice versa, their mutual nonlinear coupling entails the temporary constitution of a multi-agent system (Froese & Di Paolo 2011a). On this view, social interaction is one kind of process in an irreducible "brain-body-environment-body-brain" system as a whole, as shown in Figure 1 .
One insight that follows from this approach is that uni-directionally coupled agents (i.e., A is a detached observer of B) and mutually coupled agents (i.e., A and B interact with each other) are fundamentally different kinds of systems. In the former situation, common in the literature but hardly deserving to be called "social," B is merely an independent parameter of A's environment. In the latter situation, the nonlinear coupling between A and B results in emergent structures of the interaction process that provide top-down modulation of the two agents' behavior. Therefore, the effective degrees of freedom of an agent involved in social interaction will continually be modified. This provides a basic dynamical account of the intuition expressed by Schilbach et al. that "social cognition is fundamentally different when we are in interaction with others rather than merely observing them" (target article, Abstract). Furthermore, we do not need to assume any specialized neural modules to explain such qualitative difference in brain activity, because it is the interaction process itself that constitutes the systemic difference.
As a case in point, this insight allows us to clearly distinguish between the two situations of "double TV monitor" experiments (Murray & Trevarthen 1985) : When an infant is interacting with its mother via the live video transmission, there is one kind of overall system; when it is watching the mother via video playback, there is a qualitatively different kind of system. This systemic difference between the two situations allows us to explain qualitative changes in the infant's behavior in a relational manner, since the behavior is either part of a social interaction or it is not. Various models of this experimental setup have repeatedly confirmed that the removal of mutual responsiveness, that is, social contingency, through playback will lead to qualitative changes in an agent's behavior, even without the presence of specialized neural modules inside of the agent's brain ( Moreover, only mutually coupled systems offer the possibility that the behaviors of the agents become entrained in such a way that the social interaction process is conditioned by its own selfsustaining organization. The implications of such autonomous interaction dynamics have been much discussed by the enactive approach to social cognition (De Jaegher et al. 2010 ). Various models have investigated the dynamical underpinnings of autonomous interaction processes, and illustrated how they enable and constrain individual behavior (De Jaegher & Froese 2009 ). It appears that one important explanatory factor is the increased stability of mutually responsive engagement (Di Paolo et al. 2008) , which can in some cases make it easier for agents to jointly achieve tasks, but in other cases makes it more difficult for them to escape from the constraints of their mutual entrainment (Froese & Di Paolo 2010) .
The systemic differences between detached social observation and mutual social interaction are even more pronounced when we consider that social interaction is normally not merely about mutual coupling, like the passive exchange of heat among commuters standing inside a packed metro. Social interaction is about coordinating to devise and realize shared goals (Froese & Di Paolo 2011a). One agent's behavior creates an opening for a joint action that can only be realized through the appropriate behavior of another agent. For instance, the act of giving a present to someone is constituted by one's giving as well as the other's receiving (without the other's corresponding act of acceptance the necessary conditions of one's giving cannot be satisfied).
A special property of social coordination is that it enables flexible renegotiation of an interaction process; robotic and modeling research has shown that such renegotiations can emerge spontaneously from the interaction dynamics (Froese & Di Paolo 2011b; Quinn et al. 2003) . One reason for this flexibility is that agents are able to co-regulate their internal dynamics via the interaction process (Froese & Fuchs 2012; Froese et al. 2012). They take advantage of the fact that they constitute one complex system, and that the organization of the state-space of each brain component is partially dependent on the organization of the state-space of the whole brain-body-environment-bodybrain system.
Finally, we emphasize that this dynamical systems approach is suitable for taking the first-person perspective into account. These models can supplement traditional methods of phenomenology (Froese & Gallagher 2010), and they serve as a bridge between second-person neuroscience and phenomenological accounts of intersubjectivity (Froese & Fuchs 2012; Froese & Gallagher 2012) .
